On 06/29/22 13:50, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
On 06/28/22 16:17, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 01:49:04PM +0200, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>> When calculating the greatest possible number of matching keys in
>> get_keys(), the current expression
>>
>> MIN (1, ks->nr_keys)
>>
>> is wrong -- it will return at most 1.
>>
>> If all "nr_keys" keys match however, then we require
"nr_keys" non-NULL
>> entries in the result array; in other words, we need
>>
>> MAX (1, ks->nr_keys)
>>
>> (The comment just above the expression is correct; the code is wrong.)
>>
>> This buffer overflow is easiest to trigger in those guestfs tools that
>> parse the "--key" option in C; that is, with "OPTION_key".
For example,
>> the command
>>
>> $ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda2:key:%g' 200) -d DOMAIN
/no-such-file
>>
>> which passes 200 (different) passphrases for the LUKS-encrypted block
>> device "/dev/sda2", crashes with a SIGSEGV.
>
> A slightly better reproducer is this, since it doesn't require you to
> have an encrypted guest around:
>
> $ echo TEST | guestfish --keys-from-stdin -N part luks-format /dev/sda1 0
> $ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda1:key:%g' 200) -a test1.img /no-such-file
> Segmentation fault (core dumped)
> $ rm test1.img
I'll include this in the commit message.
In order to get the CVE fix upstream reasonably quickly, I've pushed this one (-->
commit 35467027f657), with the following commit message updates:
1: 35b49ce142fb ! 1: 35467027f657 options: fix buffer overflow in get_keys()
[CVE-2022-2211]
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@
which passes 200 (different) passphrases for the LUKS-encrypted block
device "/dev/sda2", crashes with a SIGSEGV.
+ A slightly better reproducer from Rich Jones is the following, since it
+ doesn't require an encrypted guest disk image:
+
+ $ echo TEST | guestfish --keys-from-stdin -N part luks-format /dev/sda1 0
+ $ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda1:key:%g' 200) -a test1.img
/no-such-file
+ Segmentation fault (core dumped)
+ $ rm test1.img
+
(
The buffer overflow is possible to trigger in OCaml-language tools as
@@ -71,6 +79,8 @@
Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1809453
Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100862
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek(a)redhat.com>
+ Message-Id: <20220628114915.5030-2-lersek(a)redhat.com>
+ Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/options/keys.c b/options/keys.c
--- a/options/keys.c
Thanks,
Laszlo
>
>> (
>>
>> The buffer overflow is possible to trigger in OCaml-language tools as
>> well; that is, those that call "create_standard_options" with
>> ~key_opts:true.
>>
>> Triggering the problem that way is less trivial. The reason is that when
>> the OCaml tools parse the "--key" options, they de-duplicate the
options
>> first, based on the device identifier.
>>
>> Thus, in theory, this de-duplication masks the issue, as (one would
>> think) only one "--key" option could belong to a single device, and
>> therefore the buffer overflow would not be triggered in practice.
>>
>> This is not the case however: the de-duplication does not collapse keys
>> that are provided for the same device, but use different identifier
>> types (such as pathname of device node versus LUKS UUID) -- in that
>> situation, two entries in the keystore will match the device, and the
>> terminating NULL entry will not be present once get_keys() returns. In
>> this scenario, we don't have an out-of-bounds write, but an
>> out-of-bounds read, in decrypt_mountables() [options/decrypt.c].
>>
>> There is *yet another* bug in get_keys() though that undoes the above
>> "masking". The "uuid" parameter of get_keys() may be NULL
(for example
>> when the device to decrypt uses BitLocker and not LUKS). When this
>> happens, get_keys() adds all keys in the keystore to the result array.
>> Therefore, the out-of-bounds write is easy to trigger with
>> OCaml-language tools as well, as long as we attempt to decrypt a
>> BitLocker (not LUKS) device, and we pass the "--key" options with
>> different device identifiers.
>>
>> Subsequent patches in this series fix all of the above; this patch fixes
>> the security bug.
>>
>> )
>>
>> Rather than replacing MIN with MAX, open-code the comparison, as we first
>> set "len" to 1 anyway.
>>
>> While at it, rework the NULL-termination such that the (len+1) addition
>> not go unchecked.
>>
>> Fixes: c10c8baedb88e7c2988a01b70fc5f81fa8e4885c
>> Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1809453
>> Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100862
>> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek(a)redhat.com>
>> ---
>> options/keys.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
>> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/options/keys.c b/options/keys.c
>> index 798315c2e95a..d27a7123e67e 100644
>> --- a/options/keys.c
>> +++ b/options/keys.c
>> @@ -126,21 +126,27 @@ read_first_line_from_file (const char *filename)
>> * keystore, ask the user.
>> */
>> char **
>> get_keys (struct key_store *ks, const char *device, const char *uuid)
>> {
>> - size_t i, j, len;
>> + size_t i, j, nmemb;
>> char **r;
>> char *s;
>>
>> /* We know the returned list must have at least one element and not
>> * more than ks->nr_keys.
>> */
>> - len = 1;
>> - if (ks)
>> - len = MIN (1, ks->nr_keys);
>> - r = calloc (len+1, sizeof (char *));
>> + nmemb = 1;
>> + if (ks && ks->nr_keys > nmemb)
>> + nmemb = ks->nr_keys;
>> +
>> + /* make room for the terminating NULL */
>> + if (nmemb == (size_t)-1)
>> + error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("size_t overflow"));
>> + nmemb++;
>> +
>> + r = calloc (nmemb, sizeof (char *));
>> if (r == NULL)
>> error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "calloc");
>>
>> j = 0;
>
> Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones(a)redhat.com>
Thanks!
Laszlo