On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 06:22:06PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
libvirt doesn't have a concept of "session qemu" for root:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=890291
When a libguestfs-using process runs as root, and libvirt runs a qemu subprocess, the qemu subprocess is run as a non-root user (typically qemu.qemu). This causes various problems, for example if we try to open a file which is readable by root but unreadable by qemu.qemu then the operation will fail.
This can be changed globally via a configuration file, but it can also be changed by using a <seclabel/> clause in the XML (although I think that's not the only effect):
<seclabel type="static" model="dac" relabel="no"> <label>0:0</label> </seclabel>
This patch makes that change.
I notice that after this change, qemu is indeed running as root. However the file being examined still gets relabelled by SELinux (to virt_content_t IIRC). Maybe this relabelling is in fact desirable.
If you turn off relabelling you'll certainly get SELinux denials, unless the files already have the virt_content_t label or equiv. So if you wanted to prevent SELinux labelling, you would probably have to turn off SELinux confinement entirely.
Also as you can see from the patch there are cases where we use another <seclabel model='selinux'/> element to set labels to a known value. It's not clear if we can include both <seclabel/> elements. The patch as shown overrides the selinux seclabel if running as root.
Yes, you can set multiple <seclabel> elements in the same guest - in fact if you look at a running guest you'll see two present. You just need to make sure "model" attribute is unique on each. Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|