On Thu, Nov 10, 2011 at 01:48:53PM +0000, Mark McLoughlin wrote:
Thanks for all that Rich. My takeaways are:
1) The current file injection and disk resizing code in OpenStack doesn't provide sufficient protection against the possibility of users exploiting vulnerabilities in the kernel or core OS userspace utilities.
However, there's no known vulnerability here that needs an urgent response (e.g. filing a CVE) - i.e. it's not like the issue with using qemu's disk format auto-detection.
2) Restricting the set of guest filesystems we support would eliminate one of the most likely sources of potential vulnerabilities.
3) Using libguestfs (and later, using it over libvirt/svirt) would provide much greater protection along with the potential to support things like LVM inside guest images.
Agreed. I looked at their use of qemu / format detection, and it appears safe: I tried to upload an image with backing file = /etc/passwd. You can upload such an image to glance. But when you try to attach it to a guest, any use of backing files is rejected by a correct test in nova/virt/images.py. I also looked at whether they pass the correct format field through to libvirt (and thus to qemu), and they do. Rich. -- Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones virt-p2v converts physical machines to virtual machines. Boot with a live CD or over the network (PXE) and turn machines into Xen guests. http://et.redhat.com/~rjones/virt-p2v