On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 12:11:15PM +0100, Pino Toscano wrote:
On Saturday, 16 November 2019 09:33:21 CET Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
It's considerably more convenient for callers if they don't have to store this mapping between opaque libguestfs device names (a concept which is meaningless to most users and to the software which orchestrates virt-v2v at scale), and keys.
We use devices already for various things, including partitions and (in this case) devices for keys. If you use libguestfs tools (virt-v2v included) then you need to care about them, so "callers are dumb" is not one of the best arguments you can come up with.
In practical terms this would mean IMS has to do a new round trip where we would have to do libguestfs inspection on guests before they are presented in the UI, which is a whole bunch of work, and I still don't understand why this would be necessary.
Also there's no actual penalty to making this feature available, it's a natural extension which falls out from the implementation, and it doesn't affect performance unless the caller adds multiple --key parameters. It's also how LUKS itself works if you enable decrypt_keyctl in crypttab.
This is not about performance or how LUKS works (which both are irrelevant for libguestfs users), but rather about explicitly specifying a secret only to its target.
In the case where you run virt-v2v --key --key ... then the secrets are only passed to a single VM. So even if it was possible for the VM to capture these keys, it would only be capturing keys used by its own disks. I really don't understand what could be the problem with this.
Also, this makes it possible so in case of two similar guests like: - /dev/sda1 with key "key1", and /dev/sda2 with key "key2" - /dev/sda1 with key "key2", and /dev/sda2 with key "key1" the above command like will work in the same way, with no indication of which key was successfully used for which device -- so you can silently swap the first guest for the second with no changes to the v2v command line...
I didn't understand this. It seems an unlikely scenario in the first place, and has no ill effects even if it does occur.
I disagree with your assessment. Let's say that the first guest gets a new encypted partition with coincidentally the same key as /dev/sda1: I do not want that with a wildcard --key that device is silently opened without the user acting and explicitly saying "this is the key for this device" -- even if it is the same as another device.
OK so I believe you are worried that someone uses the same --key option against two different guests. But how is that any different from now? They could still accidentally reuse a key between guests even the way it works right now. In any case I don't understand how the guest could capture or save the key, so I don't understand what the specific danger is.
What's the use case for this?
So that IMS doesn't have to collect an exact mapping between opaque libguestfs device names and keys, which will require some user to have to enter device names that they don't understand into a UI without any making typos rather than just supplying a list of keys that apply to a single guest.
Few things here: - if the UI does not help the user insert the proper mapping between devices (which cloudforms already knows) and keys, then it's a problem of the UI
The problem is cloudforms doesn't really know libguestfs device names. It knows something about devices and partitions, but those are derived from SSA not libguestfs.
- users can make typos even with your solution
If they typo the passphrase I guess everyone will expect it not to work. The problem is if they typo "/dev/sda2" which they have no idea about. Rich. -- Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones Read my programming and virtualization blog: http://rwmj.wordpress.com libguestfs lets you edit virtual machines. Supports shell scripting, bindings from many languages. http://libguestfs.org