29 May
2023
29 May
'23
8:25 a.m.
On 15.05.23 22:53, Eric Blake wrote:
Our existing use of structured replies either reads into a qiov capped at 32M (NBD_CMD_READ) or caps allocation to 1000 bytes (see NBD_MAX_MALLOC_PAYLOAD in block/nbd.c). But the existing length checks are rather late; if we encounter a buggy (or malicious) server that sends a super-large payload length, we should drop the connection right then rather than assuming the layer on top will be careful. This becomes more important when we permit 64-bit lengths which are even more likely to have the potential for attempted denial of service abuse.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake<eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru> -- Best regards, Vladimir