On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 09:38:30AM +0000, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 04:07:26PM -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
+ "set_pread_initialize", { + default_call with + args = [Bool "request"]; ret = RErr; + shortdesc = "control whether libnbd pre-initializes read buffers"; + longdesc = "\ +By default, libnbd will pre-initialize the contents of a buffer +passed to calls such as L<nbd_pread(3)> to all zeroes prior to checking +for any other errors, so that even if a client application passed in an +uninitialized buffer but fails to check for errors, it will not result +in a potential security risk caused by an accidental leak of prior heap +contents. However, for a client application that has audited that an +uninitialized buffer is never dereferenced, or which performs its own +pre-initialization, libnbd's sanitization efforts merely pessimize +performance. + +Calling this function with C<request> set to false tells libnbd to +skip the buffer initialization step in read commands."; + see_also = [Link "get_pread_initialize"; + Link "set_strict_mode"; + Link "pread"; Link "pread_structured"; Link "aio_pread"; + Link "aio_pread_structured"]; + };
Could it be worth mentioning CVE-2022-0485 by name in the text here? And/or linking to: https://listman.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2022-February/msg00104.html
Good idea, I went with: diff --git i/generator/API.ml w/generator/API.ml index 9b7eb545..aaba9951 100644 --- i/generator/API.ml +++ w/generator/API.ml @@ -784,14 +784,19 @@ "set_pread_initialize", { shortdesc = "control whether libnbd pre-initializes read buffers"; longdesc = "\ By default, libnbd will pre-initialize the contents of a buffer -passed to calls such as L<nbd_pread(3)> to all zeroes prior to checking -for any other errors, so that even if a client application passed in an -uninitialized buffer but fails to check for errors, it will not result -in a potential security risk caused by an accidental leak of prior heap -contents. However, for a client application that has audited that an -uninitialized buffer is never dereferenced, or which performs its own -pre-initialization, libnbd's sanitization efforts merely pessimize -performance. +passed to calls such as L<nbd_pread(3)> to all zeroes prior to +checking for any other errors, so that even if a client application +passed in an uninitialized buffer but fails to check for errors, it +will not result in a potential security risk caused by an accidental +leak of prior heap contents (see CVE-2022-0485 in +L<libnbd-security(3)> for an example of a security hole in an +application built against an earlier version of libnbd that lacked +consistent pre-initialization). However, for a client application +that has audited that an uninitialized buffer is never dereferenced, +or which performs its own pre-initialization, libnbd's sanitization +efforts merely pessimize performance (although the time spent in +pre-initialization may pale in comparison to time spent waiting on +network packets). Calling this function with C<request> set to false tells libnbd to skip the buffer initialization step in read commands.";
Anyway the whole patch series looks good, so:
Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Series is now checked in with amendments, as ab52914b..e0953cb7 -- Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3266 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org